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Abstract
How does media attention shape bureaucratic behavior? We answer this question using novel data 
from the Mexican federal government. We first develop a new indicator for periods of anomalously 
heightened media attention, based on 150,000 news articles pertaining to 22 Mexican government 
ministries and agencies, and qualitatively categorize their themes. We then evaluate government 
responsiveness using administrative data on roughly 500,000 requests for government informa-
tion over a 10-year period, with their associated responses. A panel fixed-effects approach dem-
onstrates effects of media attention on the volume of outgoing weekly responses, while a second 
approach finds effects on the “queue” of information requests already filed when anomalous 
media attention begins. Consistent across these empirical approaches, we find that media atten-
tion shapes bureaucratic behavior. Positive or neutral attention is associated with reduced respon-
siveness, while the effects of negative attention vary, with attention to government failures leading 
to increased responsiveness but attention to corruption leading to reduced responsiveness. These 
patterns are consistent with mechanisms of reputation management, disclosure threat, and work-
load burden, but inconsistent with mechanisms of credit claiming or blame avoidance.
  
Introduction
How does media attention shape bureaucratic be-
havior? When bureaucratic organizations are the focus 
of heightened media coverage, their responsiveness to 
the public may shift in different ways. For example, 
they may become less responsive out of fear that in-
creased scrutiny will expose information damaging to 
political principals, or more responsive in an effort to 
bolster reputations for accountability with key stake-
holders. Whether bureaucratic organizations respond 
to intense media attention by “clamping down” or 
“opening up” is of central importance for the quality of 
democratic accountability. If agencies open up during 
times of heightened coverage, increased attention can 
contribute to a virtuous cycle between public oversight 
and good governance. In contrast, if agencies clamp 
down during such moments, this may contribute to a 
vicious cycle wherein accountability processes break 
down precisely when most needed.
Using a combination of quantitative and qualita-
tive media text analysis, we analyze daily indicators of 
bureaucratic responsiveness by Mexican federal gov-
ernment agencies during media anomalies—periods 
of agency-specific heightened media attention. To 
measure responsiveness, we study the timing and 
type of official responses to requests for government 
information filed under Mexico’s 2002 access-to-
information (ATI) law. The disclosure of informa-
tion about government activities corresponds to two 
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constitutes one of the few spaces where individual 
citizens interact directly with bureaucrats in ministry 
headquarters, revealing information about these offi-
cials’ efficiency, professionalism, and commitment to 
democratic norms. Second, information requests are 
a crucial means by which citizens monitor govern-
ment performance, thereby informing other forms 
of electoral and nonelectoral participation and ac-
countability. Responses to information requests 
also offer a particularly rich source of information 
on bureaucratic behavior at a fine-grained temporal 
level, enabling us to observe the precise days of re-
ceipt and response.
We combine our data on information requests and 
responses with a novel measure of media attention to-
ward 22 Mexican federal government agencies over the 
period 2005–15. We use a corpus of roughly 150,000 
news articles mentioning specific ministries or agen-
cies by name and apply anomaly-detection methods to 
identify periods of anomalously heightened attention 
(which we generally refer to in this paper as “anom-
alies”) to each entity. After identifying these anomalies, 
we review each to categorize the underlying events as 
being focused on policy, personnel, external events, 
government failure, or corruption, as well as coding 
for negative attention. These categorizations enable us 
to differentiate the effects of heightened media atten-
tion by theme.
We assess the effects of media anomalies on gov-
ernment responsiveness using two approaches, which 
yield largely consistent results. First, we use a panel 
fixed-effects approach at an agency-week level to as-
sess the effects of media anomalies both on the volume 
of requests received and the volume of outgoing re-
sponses, comparing each anomaly-affected agency 
both with itself in other periods and with other un-
affected agencies at the same time. Second, we focus on 
the queue of requests that were already filed—but were 
still awaiting response—on the eve of each anomaly 
onset. Importantly, these “exogenous” requests are 
exposed to the anomaly’s effects despite being filed 
beforehand. We match each such anomaly-exposed 
request with other similar requests filed to the same 
agency but at other times.
Our approach has two advantages over existing 
analyses of media attention and government behavior. 
First, by differentiating between positive and nega-
tive coverage and specific themes of media coverage, 
we build on previous research that has found an 
accountability-producing effect of highly publicized 
corruption scandals (e.g., Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 
2015; Nyhan 2017) or of media exposure in general 
(e.g., Snyder and Strömberg 2010). Second, we build 
on the few existing studies that do differentiate be-
tween positive and negative coverage, yet tend to do 
so using aggregate data on media attention over longer 
periods of time (e.g., Maor, Gilad, and Bloom 2013; 
Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2013, 2016). In contrast, 
we analyze short periods of unusually heightened 
media coverage, allowing us to focus on changes in 
bureaucratic behavior when media attention is likely 
to be most salient.1
Drawing on existing theoretical approaches, we as-
sess several possible mechanisms shaping bureaucratic 
responsiveness under heightened media attention, each 
suggesting a different pattern of behaviors across dif-
ferent types of attention. Our findings suggest that 
anomalously heightened media attention has markedly 
different effects depending on the nature of the media 
attention. These findings are inconsistent with either 
a simple mechanism of credit claiming—predicting 
that officials “open up” with increased responsive-
ness during periods of positive media attention—or 
a simple mechanism of blame avoidance—predicting 
that officials “clamp down” with worsened respon-
siveness during periods of negative attention. Instead, 
we find that positive and neutral attention—such as 
after a new policy announcement—lead to reduced 
responsiveness, likely due to increased workload bur-
dens. Furthermore, we find that negative media atten-
tion leads to different types of responses depending on 
whether the agency is under scrutiny for poor perform-
ance or for corruption. Negative attention owing to 
government failure—for example botched responses to 
natural disasters—is associated with increased respon-
siveness, likely in an effort to salvage the agency’s repu-
tation. On the other hand, attention to corruption leads 
to reduced responsiveness. In such cases, the mandate 
to “stop the bleeding” by withholding information that 
could extend coverage prevails for officials facing scru-
tiny. We thus find evidence consistent with three dis-
tinct mechanisms of bureaucratic behavior: reputation 
management, disclosure threat, and workload burden.
These nuanced results suggest several implications. 
First, with respect to poor government performance, 
media attention stimulates bureaucratic responsive-
ness, driving officials to “open up” and thus bolster 
their organizations’ reputations for accountability. 
However, this effect does not extend to media attention 
related to corruption, which causes officials to “clamp 
down” to protect themselves and their colleagues. 
1 Our study focuses on responsiveness explicitly in response to queries, 
as opposed to proactive publicity that may also be an important part of 
agency strategies. Although evidence suggests that responsiveness in 
“reactive” and “proactive” transparency tend to go together across 
government entities in Mexico (Fierro et al. 2014), some agencies may 
at times substitute one for the other. Nonetheless, we focus in this 
study on responsiveness to requests, as this offers a context featuring 
temporally fine-grained information on disclosure decisions, both 







uab001/6101515 by guest on 08 Septem
ber 2021
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2021, Vol. XX, No. XX 3
These differences highlight the importance of com-
paring not only between positive and negative media 
attention, but also between different causes of media 
attention. Research on corruption scandals alone, or 
on negative media coverage in general, may fail to cap-
ture the full picture of media effects on bureaucratic 
behavior.
These findings also hold important lessons con-
cerning the accountability-generating potential of ATI 
institutions. Many emphasize that information about 
government activities and performance is crucial for 
citizens to hold politicians and officials accountable 
(e.g., Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999; Weber 
1978). Moreover, in semi-institutionalized democra-
cies such as Mexico, ATI systems increasingly play a 
central role in obtaining such information, both by 
ordinary citizens and by organized civil society, pol-
itical parties, private firms, and the media. These in-
stitutions’ importance is amplified during moments of 
heightened media attention. Where agency personnel 
are able to exercise discretion over disclosure deci-
sions—as previous research has shown in the case of 
Mexico (e.g., Almanzar, Aspinwall, and Crow 2018; 
Bagozzi, Berliner, and Almquist 2019; Berliner et  al. 
2020; Fox, Haight, and Palmer-Rubin 2011)—they 
can either limit or promote the ability of ATI to inform 
democratic processes during these crucial periods.
Although we expect that the behaviors we iden-
tify are considerations for all ATI systems, the rela-
tive weight of these mechanisms certainly varies. The 
Mexican federal government has a strong ATI law 
(Bookman and Guerrero Amparán 2009; Michener 
2015), but  operates under conditions of high levels of 
corruption and moderately high bureaucratic capacity. 
In democracies with lower levels of bureaucratic cap-
acity and record-keeping systems, we may expect work-
load burden effects to be even more substantial (e.g., 
Hyun, Post, and Ray 2018; Mutula and Wamukoya 
2009; Neuman and Calland 2007). In more institu-
tionalized democracies, one could expect the effects 
of workload burden and disclosure threat to be more 
muted, given higher levels of bureaucratic capacity and 
less prevalent corruption. Yet on the other hand, mis-
handling of ATI responses in the face of media scrutiny 
and political threats has been widely documented in 
these contexts (e.g., Roberts 2006).
Media Attention and Bureaucratic 
Responsiveness
Bureaucratic responsiveness—the degree to which civil 
servants respond to citizens’ needs or desires in the 
implementation of policies (Saltzstein 1992)—is often 
analyzed as a matter of routine, day-to-day govern-
ment–citizen interaction. For instance, many studies 
assess responsiveness to citizen requests for services, 
assistance, or information (e.g., Buntaine, Hunnicutt, 
and Komakech 2020; Costa 2017; Distelhorst and 
Hou 2014; Jilke, Van Dooren, and Rys 2018; Porter 
and Rogowski 2018; White, Nathan, and Faller 
2015). We observe responsiveness quite literally—in 
the actual responses that agency personnel provide to 
citizen2 requests for information. Although we focus 
here on formal information requests, our findings have 
implications for responsiveness in other contexts of 
citizen-government interaction, both informational—
emails, complaints, and more informal requests for 
information—and service-oriented. Previous studies 
have analyzed responses to information requests as 
functions of the traits of the citizens that make requests 
(e.g., partisanship or ethnicity) or of the institutions 
that respond (e.g., institutional capacity) (Almanzar, 
Aspinwall, and Crow 2018; Fox, Haight, and Palmer-
Rubin 2011; Wood and Lewis 2017; Worthy, John, 
and Vannoni 2017; Lagunes and Pocasangre 2019; 
Michener et  al. 2020; Poole 2019). The context of 
such day-to-day interactions does not remain constant, 
however. Citizen–agency interactions may take place 
during periods of heightened salience for the entire 
government, such as in the lead-up to an election, or 
for a specific agency in particular, such as during the 
roll-out of a new policy initiative, a high-profile failure, 
or a scandal involving agency personnel.
We analyze the effects of these periods of agency-
specific heightened media attention on responsive-
ness. Our approach differs from previous scholarship, 
which tends to measure the effect of media attention 
on responsiveness over longer time periods. For ex-
ample, some public administration research focuses 
on media attention to bureaucratic agencies (e.g., 
Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2013, 2016), or the 
policy matters being dealt with by officials (e.g., Bevan 
2015; Carpenter 2002), but over timescales of years 
that obscure the dynamics associated with specific 
periods of intense media scrutiny. Studies in political 
economy analyze spatial variation in media exposure 
to assess long-run differences in government respon-
siveness (e.g., Besley and Burgess 2002; Snyder and 
Strömberg 2010). Still others do examine temporally 
specific media attention, but focus only on other actors 
like voters, politicians, parties, or judges (Edwards 
and Wood 1999; Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010; 
Marshall 2016; Philippe and Ouss 2018; Strömberg 
2015), not bureaucratic agencies. In contrast, we ad-
dress bureaucratic responsiveness during media anom-
alies, periods when agencies receive disproportionately 
2 We use “citizen” here and below to denote any nongovernmental actor, 
including individuals, civil society organizations, journalists, business 
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heightened media attention concerning a single event 
or process. A second departure from existing literature 
is that we test the effect of a broad range of types of 
media attention on responsiveness. Prominent studies 
on media effects tend to limit analyses to corruption 
scandals alone (Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding 2012; 
Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015; Hirano and Snyder 
2012; Nyhan 2015, 2017; Puglisi and Snyder 2011). 
In contrast, we disaggregate anomalies into different 
categories, depending on the type of media attention.
Our analysis allows us to adjudicate between 
several distinct mechanisms that may characterize 
how the behavior of bureaucratic agencies shifts 
during periods of intense media scrutiny. Drawing 
on existing theories, we assess mechanisms of credit 
claiming, blame avoidance, workload burden, dis-
closure threat, and reputation management. Each of 
these mechanisms suggests different patterns of ob-
servable implications across different types of media 
attention.
First, mechanisms of credit claiming and of blame 
avoidance offer relatively straightforward predictions: 
that agencies will “open up” in response to positive 
media attention in order to “claim credit,” or alter-
nately that they will uniformly “clamp down” in re-
sponse to negative media attention in order to “avoid 
blame.” The first of these mechanisms draws on a long 
line of research on credit claiming, wherein politicians 
seek to make themselves more visible in the wake of 
positive attention (e.g., Fiorina 1977; Mayhew 1974). 
Although developed in the context of elected officials, 
credit claiming incentives have also been identified in 
the context of bureaucratic officials and agencies (e.g., 
Gilad, Alon-Barkat, and Braverman 2016; Maor 2011; 
Nielsen and Moynihan 2017). In the ATI context, this 
logic predicts that officials will be particularly eager 
to engage with the public by responding promptly to 
information requests after highly publicized successes, 
high-profile new appointments, or the roll-out of new 
policies.
On the other hand, many scholars suggest that mo-
tivations for credit claiming are outweighed by those 
for blame avoidance (Hong 2019; Hood 2010; Weaver 
1986), which predicts that officials will be less re-
sponsive in the presence of negative media attention. 
Indeed, studies of ATI systems around the world cite 
blame avoidance as a fundamental problem, as offi-
cials are reticent to disclose information about their 
activities that may cast them in a negative light. For 
example, Hood (2007) (drawing on Roberts 2006) 
notes that ATI policies “typically involve more active 
and defensive central management of information than 
before, to lower political risks of blame” (205).
Given our empirical setting, in which we can dis-
tinguish negative media attention from neutral or 
positive, these first two mechanisms thus yield straight-
forward predictions that positive attention will lead to 
increased responsiveness, and negative attention to 
reduced responsiveness. However, we contrast these 
well-established mechanisms of behavior with a set 
of alternative mechanisms highlighting other possible 
patterns, applicable in all or in specific settings: work-
load burden, reputation management, and disclosure 
threat. We present these mechanisms in order from 
most to least generally applicable.
First, we suggest that all periods of heightened media 
attention—whether positive or negative—may result in 
moderately reduced responsiveness simply due to the 
increased workload burdens placed on officials during 
these times. Practically all instances where an agency 
receives intense media attention will occur during 
times of particularly high agency workload. Increased 
demands on agency personnel’s time could result from 
the episode that drew the media’s attention in the first 
place, such as an important transition or the revelation 
of a new problem that requires action. Additionally, 
increased media attention itself may distract or pre-
occupy the agency’s leadership. With these additional 
demands on their time and attention, routine agency 
activities, such as responding to citizen requests, may 
be lowered in priority. Finally, media attention may 
drive an increase in the volume of citizen requests, 
leading to increased backlogs and thus delays. Past re-
search on street-level bureaucratic behavior has found 
high workloads associated with reduced performance 
and organizational commitment, and increased coping 
mechanisms (Jewell and Glaser 2006; Jong and Ford 
2016; Tummers et  al. 2015). By taking into account 
the realities of resource-constrained bureaucracies, 
this mechanism thus yields predictions that contradict 
those of credit claiming. Workload burden would po-
tentially be relevant under all types of media attention, 
but potentially superseded by other conflicting behav-
ioral mechanisms in some situations.
Second, we also take advantage of an empirical 
setting where we can differentiate between dif-
ferent types of negative media attention. As such, 
we further draw on existing theoretical approaches 
to distinguish mechanisms of bureaucratic respon-
siveness that predict different behaviors depending 
on whether negative scrutiny concerns government 
failure or corruption.3 Drawing on scholarship on 
bureaucratic reputations, a reputation management 
mechanism predicts increased, rather than decreased 
(as with a blame avoidance mechanism), respon-
siveness in the face of negative media attention. On 
3 Similarly, Gilad, Maor, and Ben-Nun Bloom (2015) differentiate 
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the other hand, a disclosure threat mechanism pre-
dicts decreased responsiveness in the face of negative 
media attention, but is relevant primarily in cases of 
attention to corruption. As we suggest below, the key 
difference between mechanisms of reputation man-
agement and of disclosure threat lies in whether the 
negative attention threatens the overall reputation 
of the organization, or rather the political or career 
concerns of specific individuals.
Periods of negative media attention may result in 
increased bureaucratic responsiveness due to goals 
of reputation management, as officials seek to bol-
ster their agencies’ reputations for accountability with 
independent oversight bodies, citizens, media and 
interest groups, and fellow officials. Where govern-
ment agencies are evaluated and compared on respon-
siveness metrics and subject to procedural scrutiny 
by oversight bodies, responsiveness to information 
requests has an important effect on agencies’ reputa-
tions. Positive interactions with citizens also help im-
prove the agency’s image. Finally, being forthcoming 
with subsequent information can also be part of an 
effort to engage in “damage control” and spin the 
story to reflect positively on the organization. For ex-
ample, Maor (2011) suggests that under some circum-
stances, regulatory agencies will “opt for high public 
observability” of their responses to major errors in 
order to protect their reputations (559). During media 
anomalies characterized by negative attention, this 
goal likely supersedes the effect of workload burden as 
agency leadership calls on staff to prioritize salvaging 
the agency’s image.
This reputation management mechanism draws, in 
particular, on Busuioc and Lodge ’s (2016) reputational 
approach to accountability, which diverges from 
principal-agent approaches by understanding account-
ability activities as “about sustaining one own repu-
tation vis-a-vis different audiences” and “about being 
seen as a reputable actor” (2). Rather than expecting 
organizations to resist accountability, “giving account” 
is seen as a strategy to enhance organizational repu-
tations. Indeed, Busuioc and Lodge (2016) specifically 
expect greater reputation-driven accountability when 
organizations are subject to heightened reputational 
threats such as “bad press” (7). We link this approach 
to responsiveness, an important component of account-
ability processes.
Finally, negative media attention may result in de-
creased responsiveness due to the disclosure threat 
posed by revelations of information that implicate the 
agency’s personnel or their political principals in cor-
ruption. In such instances, information requests may 
create further adverse media attention or revelations of 
wrongdoing for agency leadership. After initial revela-
tions of corruption, there is “blood in the water,” and 
future information requests may be more likely to ori-
ginate from investigative journalists or activists seeking 
to uncover more information about the affair. Such 
periods increase both the “demand side” and “supply 
side” for additional adverse information about an 
agency and its leadership, as more requests are likely 
to be politically threatening, and the information dis-
closed in response is more likely to receive public atten-
tion. Staving off such additional revelations—and the 
escalation of already-heightened attention into an even 
larger scandal—is of the highest priority for agency 
personnel (Gill and Hughes 2005; Berliner et al. 2020), 
and we expect this supersedes organizations’ incen-
tive to be forthcoming with information in order to 
improve reputations. Such prioritization will particu-
larly be the case in Mexico, as this country’s lack of 
civil service protections means responding officials can 
easily be fired, making the career and partisan goals of 
their political principals of prime importance (Benton 
2002). Notably, this mechanism is more salient for re-
sponsiveness in the domain of ATI—where the threat 
posed by disclosed information plays a key role—than 
to broader forms of bureaucratic responsiveness.
The contrast between these latter two mechanisms 
of bureaucratic behavior constitutes a refining of con-
ventional wisdom that officials will uniformly “clamp 
down” on information in the face of negative attention 
as a blame avoidance mechanism predicts. Instead, 
these mechanisms yield distinct expectations for dif-
ferent types of negative attention: improved respon-
siveness due to attention to performance failures, and 
reduced responsiveness due to attention to corruption. 
Performance failures pertain more to the organization 
as a whole and its core competencies, thus leading to 
attempts to bolster its reputation. Conversely, negative 
attention to corruption such as bribery, fraud, or pa-
tronage poses a specific threat to individual officials 
and politicians and thus is more likely to activate 
the principal-agent logic behind the disclosure threat 
mechanism. That is, responding officials may need to 
“clamp down” on information flows in order to pro-
tect superiors, thus overriding the organization’s repu-
tation management goals and leading to declines in 
responsiveness instead.
We summarize the empirical expectations suggested 
by each of these mechanisms in table 1. Each mech-
anism suggests a different pattern of findings across 
different types of media attention, thus increasing our 
ability to conclude in favor of some and against others. 
The credit claiming and blame avoidance mechanisms 
expect positive effects on responsiveness where news 
is positive, and negative effects where news is nega-
tive, respectively. The workload burden mechanism, on 
the other hand, predicts reduced responsiveness to all 
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outweighed by other mechanisms in some circum-
stances. A reputation management mechanism predicts 
positive effects on responsiveness arising from negative 
media attention. However, when such negative media 
attention pertains to corruption, rather than to govern-
ment failures, we may instead see the final mechanism 
of disclosure threat at work, as motivations to protect 
individual officials and political principals prevail.
Context
ATI requests to the Mexican government constitute a 
particularly opportune venue to observe the relation-
ship between media attention and bureaucratic respon-
siveness. First, these requests offer a source of massive 
and highly granular data about citizen–government 
interaction. Over a period of 18 years, Mexican citi-
zens have made an average of nearly 200 informa-
tion requests per day to the federal government. More 
than 20 ministries and agencies—ranging from Social 
Security to the Environment to the Defense Ministry—
regularly receive over 1,000 requests per year, offering 
a wide range of policy areas in which to observe over-
time variation in citizen requests and responsiveness. 
Second, unlike other routine modes of citizen–govern-
ment interaction—such as visits to public clinics or 
paying taxes—information requests can be relevant 
to the political environment. Information requests 
offer a tool for citizens to engage with every facet of 
an agency’s operations. Research has shown both that 
the volume and focus of information requests change 
in line with key events (Berliner, Bagozzi, and Palmer-
Rubin 2018) and that agency personnel exercise dis-
cretion in responding (or not) to information requests, 
motivated by partisan electoral goals as well as per-
sonal career incentives (Berliner et al. 2020). Future re-
search should expand our approach to observe whether 
these results replicate to other modes of citizen-state 
interaction that are less politically relevant.
Mexico’s Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a 
la Información Pública Gubernamental (Federal Law 
on Transparency and Access to Public Information, 
henceforth LFTAIPG) was passed in June 2002 and 
took effect one  year later. The law has been widely 
hailed as one of the strongest in the world, particu-
larly for its independent information commission, 
online platform, high volume of citizen usage, and im-
pressive statistics on response times and low rates of 
denial that compare favorably with many developed 
democracies (Berliner and Erlich 2015; Bookman and 
Guerrero Amparán 2009; Michener 2011). Mexico’s 
independent information commission, the Instituto 
Federal de Acceso a la Información (IFAI),4 was tasked 
with promoting awareness and usage of the new law, 
monitoring bureaucratic compliance, and hearing 
appeals. The law also created an online information 
system, unique in the world at the time, to manage 
requests. Citizens file requests5 and receive responses 
primarily through this system, originally called the 
Sistema de Solicitudes de Información but ultimately 
called INFOMEX.
We study the responsiveness of this process across 
22 federal government entities, chosen purposively 
to achieve breadth among highly requested agencies. 
Fifteen of these are cabinet-level ministries, whereas 
seven are agencies with more specific roles, as regula-
tory agencies, service providers, or state-owned enter-
prises. All entities included are among the 30 federal 
entities with the highest volume of requests. Some 
other most-requested entities were omitted, however, 
to ensure greater diversity of different types of entities. 
For example, Instituto Mexicano de la Propiedad 
Industrial and Instituto Nacional de Migración were 
included even though some higher-request-volume 
ministries were excluded, in order to ensure greater 
representation of noncabinet-level entities in the study. 
Table 2 lists all included entities.
4 In 2015, the agency name changed to INAI—“national” instead of 
“federal”—but we refer to it as IFAI in this article in accordance with 
the time period under study.
5 Though unavailable in the data analyzed below, past analyses of 
requesters’ self-reported occupations found that—of the requesters 
volunteering this information—32% identified their occupation as 
student or academic, 18% as business, 12% as government, 9% as 
media, and 30% as other (Bookman and Guerrero Amparán 2009).
Table 1. Potential Mechanisms Characterizing the Effects of Different Types of Heightened Media Attention on 
Government Responsiveness, Along With the Corresponding Expected Effects on Responsiveness of Different 
Types of Media Attention for Each Mechanism
Potential Mechanism Negative Attention to Gov. Failure Negative Attention to Corruption Positive/Neutral Attention
Credit claiming   +
Blame avoidance − −  
Workload burden − − −
Reputation management + +  
Disclosure threat  −  
Note: Plus signs indicate expected positive effects of the specified type of media attention on responsiveness, whereas minus signs indicate 
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Existing evidence, both from our own interviews6 
and from others’ research (particularly surveys con-
ducted by Ríos, Carmen Castañeda, and García 2017), 
supports the relevance of the mechanisms shown in 
table  1. Government officials in each agency’s trans-
parency liaison units (unidades de enlace, UE, later 
renamed to unidades de transparencia) face an array 
of competing pressures. We review here evidence sug-
gesting the challenges and constraints of their task in re-
sponding to information requests, the often-conflicting 
pressures they face both for and against responsive-
ness, and the ways that media attention shapes these.
First, responding officials face substantial burdens 
on their time and workloads. Responding to informa-
tion requests typically involves several different members 
of agency personnel, including the person handling the 
request, staff at the sub-ministry that holds the specific 
information requested, and the members of the transpar-
ency committee (comité de transparencia, CT), who make 
determinations about whether information is reserved, 
nonexistent, or the responsibility of a different agency.
According to a 2015 survey of government agen-
cies (Ríos, Carmen Castañeda, and García 2017), the 
average UE staff size for the 299 centralized and decen-
tralized agencies of the Mexican federal government 
was only 2.6. The median UE staff for the agencies con-
sidered in this study—which tend to be much larger—is 
still only six.7 The head of the UE is dedicated full-time 
to issues of transparency in only 8 of these 22 agencies. 
In the remainder, this position has other responsibil-
ities and sometimes is a head of an entirely different 
operational area. Many requests involving information 
that is potentially reserved or difficult to locate also 
require meetings of the CT, which typically involves 
high-ranking agency officials who are in high demand 
during periods of turmoil.
Furthermore, the irregular nature of demand for 
information poses a challenge for staffing. Although 
agencies may staff their UE based on demand in a typ-
ical week, request volume is quite irregular and tends 
to escalate significantly during media anomaly periods 
(as our results confirm). Interviewed staff members 
at several UEs suggested that daily request volumes 
could increase up to 10-fold on exceptional days, often 
brought about by media attention, presenting severe 
challenges to staff. Others reported that responding to 
information requests is deemphasized during agency 
transitions (e.g., new leadership) or intense activity 
(e.g., roll-out of a new policy).
Second, officials routinely face conflicting pres-
sures for and against responsiveness. Existing evi-
dence suggests that transparency personnel exercise 
discretion in withholding information that could 
be potentially damaging to agency leadership (e.g., 
Berliner et  al. 2020; Gill and Hughes 2005). An 
6 Based on interviews conducted with officials in the unidades de enlace 
of seven different Mexican government agencies in March 2017, under 
Arizona State University IRB number 00005773.
Table 2. Government Entities Included in This Study
Abbreviation Name Cabinet Level
CFE Comisión Federal de Electricidad No
COFEPRIS Comisión Federal para la Protección contra Riesgos Sanitarios No
CONAGUA Comisión Nacional del Agua No
IMPI Instituto Mexicano de la Propiedad Industrial No
IMSS Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social No
INM Instituto Nacional de Migración No
PEMEX Petróleos Mexicanos, No
PGR Procurador General de la República Yes
SAGARPA Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación Yes
SCT Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes Yes
SEDENA Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional Yes
SEDESOL Secretaría de Desarrollo Social Yes
SEECO Secretaría de Economía Yes
SEGOB Secretaría de Gobernación Yes
SEMARNAT Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales Yes
SENER Secretaría de Energía Yes
SEP Secretaría de Educación Publica Yes
SFP Secretaría de la Función Pública Yes
SHCP Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público Yes
SRE Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores Yes
SSA Secretaría de Salud Yes
SSP Secretaría de Seguridad Pública (only included through 2013 when merged with SEGOB) Yes
7 Here we exclude the Secretaría de Seguridad Pública because it did 







uab001/6101515 by guest on 08 Septem
ber 2021
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2021, Vol. XX, No. XX8
interviewee suggested that officials are more conser-
vative in disclosure decisions when agency personnel 
are under scrutiny for alleged corruption. Federal 
government agencies are frequently involved in al-
legations of patronage and corruption. As a “semi-
institutionalized” democracy (Levitsky and Murillo 
2009), Mexico’s bureaucracy is uneven, combining 
highly trained experts with patronage appointees 
within the same ministry. And while oversight and 
auditing institutions are formally strong, de facto 
practices in the Mexican bureaucracy are much 
more haphazard and discretionary than the techno-
cratic veneer would suggest (Cejudo 2008). Agency 
personnel are also well aware that information re-
quests can seek potentially damaging information 
about scandals. Mexico boasts a mature news media, 
highly attuned to investigating corruption and sev-
eral NGOs that specialize in using Mexico’s trans-
parency institutions to investigate and denounce 
corruption.
However, UE personnel also report that they and 
their superiors attribute importance to projecting 
openness in their responses to information requests, 
and many are committed to normative principles 
of transparency. Moreover, many UE personnel are 
highly trained with legal or other advanced degrees 
(Ríos, Carmen Castañeda, and García 2017). Agencies 
are also evaluated both by other institutions within 
the Mexican government and by civil society organ-
izations, which conduct evaluations and publish stat-
istics on transparency performance. The IFAI plays a 
key role in monitoring compliance and in handling 
appeals, which can overturn UE response decisions 
and even threaten sanctions. More important, as inter-
viewed UE officials suggested, is the threat of the add-
itional scrutiny and effort required by responses that 
are appealed. In the words of one interviewed official, 
“If we get in trouble with IFAI, it will only make things 
worse.”
Finally, agencies broadly view their responses to 
information requests as central to public relations. 
Although no interviewed personnel explicitly suggested 
that they are more careful or faster about responding 
when the agency is in the news for poor performance, 
this is the area where they are most involved in direct 
and regular contact with citizens. Officials are also 
well aware of how media attention intersects with their 
work. Interviewed UE staff exercise caution with re-
quests that they suspect are filed by journalists. One 
interviewed official admitted that a frequent saying in 
their office was that “today’s headline is tomorrow’s 
information request.”
Together, these insights suggest that UE staff face 
multiple and often-conflicting incentives during periods 
of intense media attention, which shape both their 
likelihood of providing the information requested and 
the length of time they take to respond. The tone and 
type of the anomaly itself likely tilt the balance to deter-
mine whether the context urges greater responsiveness 
or a more cautious approach. We now introduce the 
data enabling us to test these propositions empirically.
Data and Methods
Our analysis focuses on two sets of data: news-
paper data and information requests made to the 
Mexican federal government, over the period June 
2005–August 2015.
Newspaper Data and Anomaly Detection
Our newspaper data encompass articles from the 
Reforma newspaper that mention one or more of the 
22 Mexican government agencies under study. Reforma 
is the Mexican newspaper with the second-highest cir-
culation and readership (Nava 2017). However, in com-
parison to the frontrunner, El Universal, Reforma has a 
more neutral and independent image, in part because it 
relies far less on official government advertising for rev-
enue compared to other newspapers (Lawson 2002, 90). 
Reforma also offers coverage in the Lexis-Nexis database 
for a longer period of time and with fewer gaps. To obtain 
a corpus of newspaper articles mentioning each agency, 
we used a series of targeted searches in Lexis-Nexis ac-
cording to the following structure: MINISTRY AGENCY 
NAME OR ABBREVIATION OR MINSTER’S TITLE 
(for ministries only).8 For example, one search was for the 
following: “Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes” 
OR “SCT” OR “Secretario de Comunicaciones y 
Transportes.”
The raw data for this newspaper corpus contain 
219,354 articles. Because we collected articles through 
multiple search terms, some may appear multiple 
times. After removing duplicate articles and those that 
do not contain any text, we obtain 153,336 clean and 
unique articles.
We seek to identify the effect of periods of unusually 
heightened media attention on bureaucratic behavior, 
taking full advantage of the temporally fine-grained 
data available. Such an approach requires us to develop 
a measure that varies over time at a daily level and that 
varies independently for different agencies. We refer to 
these periods of unusually heightened media attention 
as “anomalies” and develop an approach to measuring 
them while also accounting for changes in attention 
that agencies would reasonably anticipate, resulting 
from seasonal shifts or broader trends over time. Some 
8 For three ministries whose common abbreviations would yield too many 
false positives, the search omitted the abbreviation. In all subsequent 
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of these anomalies reflect scandals over corruption or 
government failure, yet we do not assume that anom-
alous attention is always due to such negative causes.
Media attention to bureaucratic organizations ap-
pears as an increased number of articles mentioning 
those organizations within newspaper coverage. We 
call these periods “agency-anomaly periods.” Note 
that any single agency can have a varying number of 
agency-anomaly periods ranging from many to none. 
A given underlying event may also be associated with 
anomaly periods appearing across multiple agencies at 
similar times. For example, a major policy announce-
ment could involve media attention to two agencies at 
the same time.
To match our conceptual interest in periods of 
unusually heightened media attention, we draw in-
spiration from social media techniques (Vallis, 
Hochenbaum, and Kejariwal 2014), where (as in most 
time-series analysis) we consider each of the a time 
series of agency-newspaper coverage with time units t 
as being composed of a trend component (Mat), a sea-
sonal component (Sat), and a residual (Rat). After re-
moving both Mat and Sat, we are interested in finding 
time periods with large residuals.
Accounting for these different sources of variation is 
essential. Media coverage of some agencies tends to ex-
pand or contract continuously over time, and agencies 
can anticipate these trends. Coverage for other agencies 
is potentially also subject to seasonal variation. For ex-
ample, one would expect Mexico’s social development 
ministry (SEDESOL) to have increased attention during 
the routine annual periods where it publicizes calls for 
social program applications. Again, agencies would 
reasonably anticipate this seasonal coverage.
We first model each agency’s coverage as a weekly 
aggregated independent time series. For each time 
series, Mat is removed by applying a moving average 
to our time series. We only consider past values for 
detrending in order to avoid using future data. For 
each year, each detrended series is subsequently purged 
of any seasonal component Sat, leaving the residual 
component Rat capturing all remaining variation.9
Having obtained the residual time series, we as-
sume that they approximately follow a Gaussian dis-
tribution and are thus well suited to generalized ESD 
tests (Rosner 1983) to identify anomalies. The G-ESD 
takes a parameter k, which is the upper bound for 
the number of anomalies (outliers) it can detect per 
series.10 In our case, we set k = 10.11 We then take the 
identified unusually large positive residuals and con-
sider these our periods of anomalously heightened 
media attention.
Since this approach relies on aggregation into weeks, 
we perform a naive bootstrapping process in order to 
relax this constraint and allow for anomalies of vari-
able duration. We repeat the weekly time-series aggre-
gation seven times, each time using a different day of 
the week as a starting point. To calculate an agency’s 
anomaly periods, the day interval of each detected 
anomaly was found for each of the seven anomaly-
week ranges. The overlapping intervals were merged, 
giving us a date range for an anomaly specified to the 
day. We repeated this procedure for each agency.
This procedure yields a total of 135 anomalies 
over the 2005–16 period. Supplementary figures 1–5 
show the daily time series of news article mentions 
for selected government agencies, while highlighting 
periods that the anomaly-detection algorithm identi-
fies as anomalies. Some anomalies clearly stand out 
visually, whereas others are distinguished only after 
the removal of the trend and seasonal components. 
Notably, the anomaly-detection procedure is run sep-
arately for each agency, meaning that an anomalously 
high number of mentions for one might be a very low 
number for another. Our approach is thus not appro-
priate to compare the overall number of anomalies 
across agencies. We accordingly include agency fixed 
effects in all models further below.
To assess the substantive focus of each anomaly, 
two of the authors reviewed the news articles asso-
ciated with each identified anomaly. The authors de-
veloped and applied a coding scheme and agreed on 
a consolidated set of labels based on a two-step pro-
cess of independent coding followed by discussion. See 
Supplementary Appendix C for the complete coding 
rules and definitions applied in this process.
This process resulted in a description of each 
underlying anomaly event, with an associated categor-
ization into one or more of the following five themes: 
policy (72), personnel (21), external events (45), gov-
ernment failure (29), and corruption (27). Five anom-
alies were excluded from further analysis as they 
pertained to unrelated entities or were an artifact of 
unusual news features. Eight more were excluded as 
there was no single clear event underlying the media 
attention.
Each anomaly was also coded for whether or not the 
underlying event posed a substantial risk of negative 
scrutiny or controversy. Although this “negative” label 
was applied automatically for cases of government 
failure or corruption, it was necessary to further distin-
guish the tone of media coverage for events pertaining 
to other themes. For instance, some policy events per-
tained to highly controversial issues, such as a reform 
9 For more detail, see Supplementary Appendix B.1.
10 G-ESD also takes an α parameter, for the levels of statistical 
significance. We set α = .05.
11 We also test for k = 20 and find no substantial differences. A larger k did 
not increase the number of anomalies, providing additional certainty 
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permitting private investment in the state oil company. 
And some external events clearly “looked bad” for the 
agency in question even when there was no obvious 
governance failure (or where the relevant failure per-
tained to some other entity). In some models, we use a 
separate indicator specifically to capture these negative 
anomalies that are not also coded as either corruption 
or government failure, calling these “controversy.”
Given that our information request data run 
through mid-2015, we further exclude 14 more anom-
alies that fall after this (after already excluding those 
that qualitative coding indicated were not relevant), 
for a total of 108 anomalies used in the analyses that 
follow. Table 3 lists 10 example anomalies, along with 
our qualitative interpretation of the focus of each. See 
Supplementary Appendix D for a more extended set of 
examples for each category.
Information Requests and Responses
To assess the effect of anomalously heightened media 
attention on government responsiveness, we draw on a 
collection of every ATI request filed with Mexican fed-
eral government agencies, along with their associated 
responses. Roughly 500,000 of these pertain to agen-
cies included in this study from 2005 to 2015. Each 
entry contains the full text of the request as entered 
by the requester into the INFOMEX system, the date 
and time filed, request medium,12 the agency the re-
quest is directed to, the date of response, the nature of 
the response, and links to any attached files associated 
with either the request or the response. We exclude all 
requests for (confidential) requester personal data, as 
while these are contained in the same publicly avail-
able database from INFOMEX, they are governed by 
different legal requirements, and additionally do not 
make public their request texts. However, we consider 
these personal data requests in a robustness check.
We draw on previous studies (Berliner, Bagozzi, 
and Palmer-Rubin 2018; Berliner et  al. 2020) that 
used quantitative text analysis methods to observe the 
topics and other characteristics of these requests, and 
more generally in public administration (Hollibaugh 
2019). To enable comparisons among similar requests 
across agencies and over time, we use the 20 topics 
produced by a Latent Dirichlet Allocation model in 
Berliner, Bagozzi, and Palmer-Rubin (2018). Further 
details, justification of parameter choices, and a full 
interpretation of each topic are found in that study. 
Following Berliner et  al. (2020), we include several 
other measures, including word length (logged), read-
ability, inclusion of an attached file, the medium of the 
request, an index of legalistic words, and punctuation.
In some models, we aggregate each agency’s vol-
umes of requests received and of responses provided 
to the level of agency-weeks. But in other approaches, 
we model responsiveness at the level of individual re-
quests themselves, using two alternative dependent 
variables to capture both the timing and the nature of 
the response.
In the context of information requests, responsive-
ness is the extent to which citizens receive the informa-
tion they seek, in useful form, and in a timely fashion, 
except in cases legitimately subject to legal exemptions 
from disclosure. Thus, more responses within the legal 
time limit equate clearly to greater responsiveness. 
However, a greater number of denied requests does not 
necessarily equate to poor responsiveness, if those re-
quests fall outside of the scope of the LFTAIPG, were 
sent to the wrong agency, or seek information falling 
under legal exemptions such as personal data, national 
security, or commercial secrets.
To account for these complexities, we construct two 
different measures of responsiveness. First, we simply 
Table 3. Ten Example Media Anomalies, With Description and Categorization
Entity Year Description Theme Negative
SEMARNAT 2008 National Reforestation Day with goal of planting 5 million trees. Policy 0
IMSS 2013 Proposals to raise payroll deductions for social security. Policy 1
SENER 2006 New Secretary announced as Calderón enters office. Personnel 0
SAGARPA 2009 New Secretary announced. Personnel 0
SEECO 2012 Egg shortages lead to price increases, so Secretary temporarily 
allows tariff-free importation.
External (+ Policy) 0
SAGARPA 2013 Mass death of farmed shrimp due to bacteria. External (+ Gov. failure) 1
CONAGUA 2007 Water contamination at Valsequillo Dam. Gov. failure 1
SRE 2015 New passport system faces technical failure, linked to earlier 
questionable contracts.
Gov. Failure  
(+ Corruption)
1
CFE 2011 Investigation of corruption by former CFE Director of Operations 
accused of accepting bribes including a yacht and a Ferarri.
Corruption 1
SAGARPA 2011 Accusations SAGARPA involved in vote-buying in Michoacán 
governor election.
Corruption 1
12 Electronic requests comprise 97% of the total, versus manual requests 
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measure the (logged) time-to-response in working days, 
after excluding both weekends and official Mexican 
government holidays. One might be skeptical of fo-
cusing on timeliness, given that a delayed-but-positive 
response still delivers the requested information ac-
cording to legal mandates. However, many requests 
are time sensitive, particularly those of investigative 
or political relevance. Journalists—as well as civil so-
ciety groups investigating corruption or electoral im-
proprieties—face internal and/or external deadlines 
that may lead them to abandon a line of inquiry in the 
face of delays. Activist organizations may likewise face 
decision-making deadlines in the political processes 
they are attempting to influence.
Second, we measure the type of response, based 
on official categories of response recorded by agency 
personnel. Importantly, requests may be denied for le-
gally compliant reasons, and official response designa-
tions may not always be accurate (Fox, Haight, and 
Palmer-Rubin 2011; Lagunes and Pocasangre 2019). 
Following Berliner et  al. (2020), we combine three 
commonly abused forms of response: Claims that the 
requested information does not exist, claims that the 
requested information is fully or partially classified, 
or responses requiring the requester either to appear 
physically at an office or to pay a fee for information 
to be shipped rather than delivered electronically. Past 
research on ATI in Mexico has suggested that these 
response designations are often misused in legally 
noncompliant ways to avoid disclosure or raise bar-
riers to the requester (Almanzar, Aspinwall, and Crow 
2018; Fox, Haight, and Palmer-Rubin 2011; Lagunes 
and Pocasangre 2019). This combined “bad response” 
indicator takes values of one for 15% of responses 
from the agencies included in this study.
Modeling Approach
We seek to assess the effect of anomalous periods of 
media attention on bureaucratic responsiveness. Given 
the complex structure of our data, we study this ques-
tion in two complementary ways, both at the agency-
week level and at the individual request level.
First, we construct a panel of agency-weeks. For each 
agency-week, we count the total number of requests 
received and the total number of responses emitted. We 
also measure the proportion of each agency-week that 
is “exposed” to anomalous media attention, either in 
general or for specific subcategories of media anom-
alies. This data structure enables us to use a panel 
fixed-effects approach to compare anomaly-exposed 
agencies both with themselves during nonanomaly 
periods and with other nonexposed agencies at the 
same time. The ability to account for both agency and 
week fixed effects also captures any other unobserved 
differences, either across agencies or pertaining to par-
ticular time periods.
Using this approach, we model response output 
to understand how government officials’ activity is 
affected by such media attention.13 We control for 
agency and week fixed effects and for lagged values 
of both request volume and response volume. Under 
many circumstances, inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable alongside fixed effects would raise concerns 
of Nickell bias, but in this case, the number of periods 
is sufficiently large (over 500 weeks) that this is not a 
concern. We cluster standard errors by agency.
Although the panel fixed-effects approach is ap-
pealing both for its simplicity and ability to make 
comparisons over time and across agencies, it has 
two shortcomings. First, it aggregates away from 
our fine-grained data on each individual request and 
response. Second, some responses during anomaly-
exposed weeks may be to requests filed after the onset 
of the anomalous media attention, and thus potentially 
endogenous to it. To examine exogenous requests 
exclusively, our second empirical approach thus fo-
cuses on the queue of requests that had been filed, but 
were awaiting response, on the eve of each anomaly 
onset.14 Making appropriate comparisons is more 
difficult in this context, particularly as requests that 
are “in queue” for longer periods before receiving a 
response will also have higher exposure to potential 
media anomalies than will requests that receive rapid 
responses. Our solution is to compare each request 
from “exposed” queues with a set of matched com-
parison requests (on the same topic, and with the same 
number of days already elapsed in queue) drawn from 
comparison queues at the same agency but during 
nonanomaly periods. Our procedure is described in 
full in Supplementary Appendix E.
After constructing matched comparison groups, 
we model time-to-response and indicators of “bad” 
response, within comparison groups, as a function 
of anomaly exposure (either in general or for subcat-
egories of anomaly), with and without request-level 
control variables. By including fixed effects for each 
comparison group, we automatically account for 
fixed effects for each anomaly and for each agency. 
We can also differentiate results by the characteris-
tics of each anomaly. Standard errors are clustered by 
comparison group.
13 In Supplementary Appendix F, we also model request volume itself to 
better understand whether different types of anomalous media attention 
result in increased numbers of requests filed with corresponding 
agencies.
14 In Supplementary Appendix H, we explicitly test whether requests 
themselves might trigger anomalous media attention and find no 
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Given that both empirical strategies require very 
large numbers of fixed effects, all approaches use 
linear models. In the panel fixed-effects approach, the 
dependent variables are the logged count of responses 
provided per week.15 In the queue-based approach, the 
dependent variables are the logged number of days re-
maining until response, and a dichotomous indicator 
for “bad” responses.
Note that for the panel fixed-effects models of re-
sponses provided per week, a positive coefficient 
reflects greater responsiveness, whereas for the queue-
based models of individual requests’ time-to-response 
or “bad” response, a positive coefficient reflects worse 
responsiveness.
Results
In table  4, we assess the effects of media anomalies 
on government responsiveness measured as the weekly 
volume of responses provided.16 The first model shows 
that there is no overall average effect of media anomalies 
on responses by agency-week. However, disaggregating 
by anomaly types demonstrates important differences. 
The second model shows that, while there is no overall 
effect for negative anomalies, other anomalies (posi-
tive or neutral) are associated with reduced response 
activity, equivalent to roughly 22.4% fewer responses 
provided per week. The third model further differen-
tiates negative media anomalies by type, finding that 
the preceding null effect of negative anomalies actu-
ally masks opposing effects of government failure and 
corruption. Media anomalies reflecting government 
failure are associated with roughly 21.7% more re-
sponses per agency-week, while anomalies reflecting 
corruption are associated with roughly 20.1% fewer 
responses per agency-week. We find no significant ef-
fect for negative controversy attention without either 
government failure or corruption. Finally, the fourth 
model differentiates anomalies only by themes, again 
finding opposing effects of government failure and 
corruption.
In table 5, we consider this pattern of results in light 
of the theoretical mechanisms summarized in table 1. 
We observe a pattern that is most consistent with three 
of the mechanisms, and least consistent with two others. 
We can first rule out a mechanism of credit claiming, 
which expects that positive and neutral media atten-
tion will be associated with greater responsiveness. We 
instead find an association with worsened responsive-
ness for positive and neutral attention, consistent only 
with workload burden. This decrease in responsiveness 
from non-negative attention suggests that being in the 
media spotlight, on its own, may reduce responsiveness 
simply by increasing government officials’ workloads 
or drawing their attention away from the daily task of 
responding to ATI requests.
Turning to negative media anomalies, these appear 
to follow distinct dynamics depending on the specific 
theme of attention. We find improved responsiveness 
during media anomalies related to government failure, 
which is expected only in line with a reputation man-
agement mechanism, wherein agency personnel attempt 
to counteract negative media attention by projecting 
an image of competence and openness. However, for 
corruption-related anomalies we instead find a nega-
tive relationship with responsiveness. Although here a 
negative relationship could be consistent with multiple 
mechanisms, the opposite findings for negative atten-
tion to corruption and to government failures appears 
most consistent with a disclosure threat mechanism 
being not only in operation, but salient enough to out-
weigh the positive influence of the reputation manage-
ment mechanism. We thus interpret this as support for 
a disclosure threat mechanism, wherein agency per-
sonnel are less responsive to information requests in 
contexts where providing more information could po-
tentially exacerbate an ongoing scandal that threatens 
key personnel or political principals.
We now turn to our second empirical strategy, which 
focuses on purely “exogenous” requests that were al-
ready filed prior to anomaly onset. These models com-
pare individual requests in anomaly exposed queues 
to comparison requests filed with the same agency, 
on the same topic, and with the same number of days 
elapsed since filing on other comparison dates with no 
anomaly exposure. As above, we compare within these 
matched groups in assessing either the logged number 
of days remaining until response, or an indicator for 
commonly abused response types. Recall that the direc-
tion of coefficients here is reversed, with positive coef-
ficients reflecting reduced government responsiveness.
Findings using this second approach are largely 
consistent with the first approach. In Supplementary 
Appendix G, we first model average effects of anomaly 
exposure. The first set of results shows a small average 
effect in the direction of faster responses. Yet the second 
set of results shows that anomaly exposure has a small 
average effect, increasing the rate of “bad” responses. 
As request-level covariates make little substantive dif-
ference to the main coefficients of interest, we omit 
them from subsequent models. In table 6, we again un-
pack these average effects and differentiate by type of 
media anomaly. Models 1 and 2 show consistent effects 
in different directions for negative as opposed to posi-
tive or neutral anomalies. Negative media anomalies 
15 All results are highly similar when using an inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation in place of log.
16 See Supplementary Appendix F for models assessing anomaly effects 
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are associated both with faster responses (conditional 
on the number of days already elapsed) and a lower 
rate of “bad” responses, whereas other media anom-
alies are associated both with slower responses and a 
higher rate “bad” responses. Models 3 and 4 further 
disaggregate negative media anomalies into three types, 
as before, and again find effects in different directions 
for government failure and corruption, although not all 
statistically significant. Models 5 and 6 then disaggre-
gate media anomalies by theme only, finding no signifi-
cant effects for government failure and corruption, but 
in opposite directions for time-to-response.
Importantly, the relative directions of these results 
are largely consistent with the preceding results from 
the panel fixed-effects approach, when comparing 
the effects of negative and positive media anomalies 
on government responsiveness, and when comparing 
anomalies focused on government failure and cor-
ruption. The differences in findings across types of 
media anomaly again support three mechanisms (a) 
a workload burden mechanism that pertains to all 
anomalies; (b) a reputation management mechanism 
that pertains to negative anomalies concerning 
government failures; and (c) a disclosure threat 
mechanism that pertains to anomalies involving 
corruption.
A final set of analyses follows the same empirical 
strategy as the panel fixed-effects models above, but 
Table 4. Panel Fixed-Effects Models of the Logged Number of Responses Provided by Agency-Week
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Lagged request volume (log) 0.258*** 0.258*** 0.258*** 0.258***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged response volume (log) 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.157***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Anomaly exposure −0.039    
 (0.487)    
Anomaly exposure: negative  0.006   
  (0.924)   
Anomaly exposure: positive/neutral  −0.202** −0.202**  
  (0.039) (0.039)  
Anomaly exposure: gov. failure   0.197** 0.182
   (0.028) (0.137)
Anomaly exposure: corruption   −0.187** −0.166**
   (0.026) (0.044)
Anomaly exposure: controversy   0.023  
   0.793  
Anomaly exposure: policy    −0.090
    (0.229)
Anomaly exposure: personnel    0.032
    (0.726)
Anomaly exposure: external    0.022
    (0.790)
N 1,924 11,924 11,924 11,924
R2 .740 .741 .741 .741
Note: All models include agency fixed effects and week fixed effects. Larger coefficients indicate higher government responsiveness. SE clus-
tered by agency. p-values are displayed in parentheses.
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .01.
Table 5. Summary of Results, Contrasted With Original Table 1 of Potential Mechanisms and the Corresponding 
Expected Effects on Responsiveness of Different Types of Media Attention for Each Mechanism
Potential Mechanism Negative Attention to Gov. Failure Negative Attention to Corruption Positive/Neutral Attention
Credit claiming   +
Blame avoidance − −  
Workload burden − − −
Reputation management + +  
Disclosure threat  −  
Observed relationships + − −
Note: Plus signs indicate expected or observed positive effects of the specified type of media attention on responsiveness, whereas minus signs 
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focused on requests for personal data rather than 
requests for government information. These per-
sonal data requests are filed via the same centralized 
INFOMEX system, but are governed by different 
legal requirements and (for good reason) do not make 
public the requests themselves or their responses. 
However, we do still have information on both request 
and response dates, enabling us to study weekly agency 
response effort as we did for information requests. 
Usefully, personal data requests offer a setting in which 
we can rule out the relevance of any mechanism per-
taining to shaping information flows, as the responses 
to these requests are provided only to requesters and 
presumably concern only private matters. Thus, as a 
form of government responsiveness, these can be con-
sidered closer to nonpublic processes like answering 
individual requests for assistance or processing pro-
gram applications.
In this setting, we should have no reason to expect 
mechanisms of disclosure threat or of credit claiming 
and blame avoidance to be relevant. We may still 
clearly expect, however, a workload burden model to 
be relevant. A reputation management mechanism may 
also be relevant, as nonpublic responsiveness also mat-
ters to key stakeholders like citizens and the informa-
tion commission.
We see many of the same results as for responses to 
information requests (see Supplementary Appendix I 
for full table of results). Negative anomalies are still 
associated with greater responsiveness and positive or 
neutral anomalies with worsened responsiveness. But 
in this setting, the negative anomalies’ effect is driven 
only by controversies, not by government failures or 
corruption. This provides additional confirmation of 
the relevance of a workload burden mechanism, as 
well as of a reputation management mechanism, in a 
setting where these remain applicable. The lack of evi-
dence of a disclosure threat mechanism—in this setting 
where we would not expect it to be relevant—supports 
the earlier finding of corruption anomalies’ adverse 
effect on government responsiveness to requests for 
public information.
Discussion and Conclusion
When bureaucratic agencies experience media scrutiny, 
to what extent do they “clamp down” or “open up” 
in their responsiveness to citizens? We evaluate these 
questions in the context of 22 Mexican federal govern-
ment agencies during the years 2005–15. To measure 
responsiveness, we use roughly half a million official 
responses to requests for government information filed 
under Mexico’s 2002 access-to-information (ATI) law. 
To operationalize media attention, we collect a corpus 
of roughly 150,000 unique news articles mentioning 
specific Mexican agencies by name, applying anomaly 
detection methods to identify periods of anomal-
ously heightened attention to each entity. Qualitative 
Table 6. Linear Models of Request-Level Response Time and Response Type, Within Matched Comparison Groups
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Dependent variable: Time Type Time Type Time Type
Anomaly exposure: negative −0.040*** −0.014**     
 (0.005) (0.036)     
Anomaly exposure: positive/neutral 0.042* 0.057*** 0.042* 0.057***   
 (0.100) (0.000) (0.100) (0.000)   
Anomaly exposure: gov. failure   −0.038 −0.035*** −0.028 −0.008
   (0.138) (0.003) (0.414) (0.586)
Anomaly exposure: corruption   0.005 0.006 0.037 −0.010
   (0.848) (0.627) (0.174) (0.456)
Anomaly exposure: controversy   −0.048** −0.010   
   (0.031) (0.348)   
Anomaly exposure: policy     0.000 0.033***
     (0.982) (0.000)
Anomaly exposure: personnel     −0.102*** 0.020
     (0.002) (0.185)
Anomaly exposure: external     −0.018 −0.041***
     (0.534) (0.003)
N 82,359 82,359 82,359 82,359 82,359 82,359
R2 .448 .451 .448 .451 .448 .451
Note: Each anomaly-exposed request from the queue of requests awaiting response on the day before anomaly onset is matched with com-
parison requests to the same agency, on the same topic, and awaiting response for the same number of days as of sampled comparison dates. 
Larger coefficients indicate lower government responsiveness. All models include fixed effects for each comparison group. SE clustered by 
comparison group. p-values are displayed in parentheses.
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interpretation further allows us to differentiate those 
anomalies associated with substantial negative media 
attention or controversy, and to separate them by 
themes including government failure and corruption. 
Together, these strategies enable us to measure and as-
sess bureaucratic behaviors, and media scrutiny, at ex-
tremely fine-grained levels.
Across two separate empirical strategies, we find 
broadly consistent results that the effect of media at-
tention is contingent on the nature of the coverage. 
We first find that non-negative media attention de-
creases bureaucratic responsiveness. By contrast, when 
faced with negative media attention, we find that of-
ficials react differently based on the cause: respon-
siveness increases in the face of heightened attention 
over government failures, but decreases in cases of 
corruption-oriented attention. These nuanced findings 
are inconsistent with simplistic mechanisms of credit 
claiming or blame avoidance and instead are most 
consistent with mechanisms of bureaucratic behavior 
emphasizing workload burden, disclosure threat, and 
reputation management.
Our results have several important implications. 
First, the media spotlight matters for bureaucratic be-
havior. Going beyond macro-level spatial relationships 
between media and government responsiveness (e.g., 
Besley and Burgess 2002; Snyder and Strömberg 2010), 
we demonstrate that media exposure effects can also be 
identified at a micro level, comparing specific govern-
ment agencies over specific time periods. Second, at least 
when it comes to government failures, pressure from 
the media plays an important role leading to increased 
responsiveness by government officials. However, 
media coverage may play a counterproductive role 
during corruption scandals, “tipping off” agency per-
sonnel to the threat posed by further investigation and 
yielding reduced responsiveness. Third, research specif-
ically on corruption scandals may be limited in its gen-
eralizability, as we find the effect of corruption-related 
attention to be distinct from the effect of other nega-
tive attention. Finally, our novel method for measuring 
media attention suggests a useful new approach that 
avoids ex ante specification of specific types of media 
attention through the use of keyword searches. Instead, 
our approach looks first for anomalous periods of 
heightened media attention and then evaluates the sub-
stantive focus of those periods. This approach could 
fruitfully be applied to other contexts, such as studying 
how media anomalies shape other public services pro-
vision, or even detecting anomalous mentions of gov-
ernment agencies in social media.
These findings also suggest potential policy recom-
mendations for the design of ATI systems. Encouraging 
is the novel finding that agencies use ATI institutions to 
communicate with citizens after high-profile instances 
of failure. This behavior is compatible with a virtuous 
cycle of information and accountability. On a more 
cautionary note, we have uncovered two liabilities of 
ATI systems during media anomalies. First, agency re-
sponsiveness may suffer in these crucial periods simply 
due to increased workloads. This finding once again 
underscores the importance of proactive government 
transparency systems that relieve personnel of the need 
to handle information requests when their attention is 
needed elsewhere. Second, we confirmed the relatively 
unsurprising prediction that agencies become less 
forthcoming about their activities in the midst of cor-
ruption scandals. Given this tendency, well-functioning 
horizontal accountability institutions—such as anti-
corruption commissions—are essential. It may simply 
be too much to ask for agencies to disclose information 
that indicts leadership when they enjoy the discretion 
not to.
Future research may explore the generalizability of 
our findings beyond the Mexican context. Perhaps in 
countries with ATI systems less subject to discretionary 
disclosure, we would not find an effect of negative 
media coverage on responsiveness because officials’ 
hands would be tied in responding, whether or not it 
contributes to their goals of reputation management 
or limiting threatening disclosures. Furthermore, re-
sults may differ where more government information 
is already available online; particularly in functional 
systems of “targeted transparency” in which pro-
active disclosure is tailored to likely uses of informa-
tion (Fung 2013). In such a context, we would expect 
a dampened workload burden effect, as the volume of 
real-time information requests could be depressed by 
the prior availability of relevant information.
An important qualification of our study is the 
focus on responsiveness specifically in a context of 
citizen–government interactions, and particularly 
requests for information. Further extensions could 
test for these effects across different arenas of bur-
eaucratic responsiveness, not just informational but 
also service-oriented (e.g., public clinics, passport 
processing). Compared with these, responsiveness 
in the informational context is notable in two ways. 
First, demand increases during media anomalies, 
with each additional request constituting a signifi-
cant marginal time investment for agency personnel. 
Thus, this arena of responsiveness may be particu-
larly sensitive to shocks in workload. Second, re-
sponses that constitute publicity of agency activities 
may be more prone to disclosure threat pressures. In 
service-oriented arenas of responsiveness, such mo-
tivations for decreased responsiveness should be less 
salient, whereas reputation management may remain 
similarly important. If this is the case, we would ex-
pect to find agencies performing better during all 
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Supplementary Material
Supplementary data are available at Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory online.
Data Availability
Replication code and data are available at https://doi.
org/10.7910/DVN/O9GXL4.
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